Deep Crossing Route - Larry Fitzgerald style

Crossing routes are a part of every passing team's offense. But we mostly hear on TV about the shallow cross, where a receiver drags across the field at about six yards or less. Good route. But when teams want a big play, they increasingly turn to the deep crossing route, a route that seems -- at least based on the media coverage -- far less well understood than its little brother.

There was a fantastic example of the deep cross this past weekend in the NFL playoff game between the Arizona Cardinals and the Carolina Panthers: Kurt Warner hit Larry Fitzgerald dragging across the field for a touchdown late in the first half.

So this is a play worth examining. Moreover, it is an Airraid staple, and Bill Walsh himself put this route and related concepts to great use.

In this article I will to first discuss the route itself. Then, using a little video from the Cardinals game (hence the Larry Fitzgerald reference) I want to show how the Cardinals and many other teams combine the deep crossing route within an overall route structure or pass concept. And finally I will briefly discuss how the route is used in the West Coast or Airraid offenses, within a similar but slightly different route structure. I have video of Texas Tech to further demonstrate.

The Route

The route is simple to describe but takes a lot of practice to perfect. The receiver must have a medium to tight split from the tackle (i.e. in closer to the line rather than split out too wide) and he begins his route inside as if he is running maybe an inside curl. He of course climbs to a depth of around 10-12 yards before breaking across the field, to a point roughly 17-22 yards from the sideline. Against man, the receiver will keep running. Against zone, he will find wherever the open grass is. Sometimes that involves just continuing to run to the open spot near the sidelines; other times the open grass is found by settling in a window between defenders.

Here's where technique comes into play. While, as with any crossing route, the receiver has a lot of freedom, there are some specific guideposts for anyone running it. The biggest is he wants to go under Will (or Sam) and over Mike. What?

To explain: the receiver wants to slip underneath or inside the outside linebacker and over the middle linebacker. (Mike = Middle linebacker; Sam = strongside; Will = weakside.) There are a few reasons for this. One is that, if done correctly, the receiver should have a clean release while still distorting the zones as he passes through them. Second, there are specific distortions he's looking for.

The outside linebacker is typically responsible for some kind of outside or hook (intermediate) zone; going inside him is the best way to get away from that guy, but if the linebacker tries to cover the crosser in any way, he will have to chase him rather than wall him off.

Going over the middle linebacker is consistent with general route-running strategy, which is that the easiest way to lose a guy is to go so he can't see you. If the receiver cuts in front of him the defender can see exactly where he's going and break on the ball and the player. By going behind him, the receiver not only stretches the linebacker deep, but the receiver also is more likely to lose him. You'll see in the video below that Fitzgerald goes over the middle linebacker, number 52 for the Panthers. (Of course, especially in the NFL, it's not easy to see what coverage they are in. NFL announcers misidentify coverages all the time; good coaches in the booth say they can't always even identify what they are doing. This is one reason why routes like this are good: they are versatile, by flooding zones and breaking away from man, and generally giving the receiver freedom. I think on the play below the Panthers were in some kind of man coverage with some defenders, including the middle linebacker, acting as floaters.)

As a final note, if the middle linebacker refuses to let the receiver go over the top, there are two responses: one, the crosser can break underneath because the Mike is either out of position or is actually playing the deep middle ("Tampa-Two," which is not really two-deep at all), and, second, the coach should call an inside curl by that player the next time to take advantage of this super-deep drop by the middle linebacker.

Deep Cross with a Double Post

Below is how the Cardinals ran the play, with the split-end (here, Larry Fitzgerald), running the deep crossing route underneath two receivers on the playside running post routes.

In the clip below, both the runningback and H-back stay in to block, but my guess is that their responsibility is to "check-release," i.e. look for blitzers and release if no one comes. See here for more on check releasing and pass protection in general. Below is a clip of the Cardinals running the route from a few angles. And do forgive my nascent internet video editing skills. There's a slight pause in the middle but the clip keeps going.



And below is a diagram of how the Colts use the play off of a play-action look for their stretch run play. (They like this as play-action off the stretch run to the weakside, with the tight-end staying in to the backside.)



As you can see from the diagrams, the first thing that the overall route structure does is pull the secondary deep to open it up for the deep cross. Nothing too exciting there. Also, the underneath tight-end, H-back, and runningbacks pass protecting and leaking into the route (along with play-action) helps suck up the intermediate defenders to create that window for the cross. The play is a type of vertical stretch.

But more specifically, let's look at the double-post. Actually, the outside receiver (here, "Z") will run a "skinny post" or "glance" route -- he will burst off the line and at around 10 yards will stick his outside foot and angle just slightly inside the corner, and the ball will not be chucked down the field as a bomb but instead quickly into the seam at around 15-18 yards as a kind of deep slant. But, if he gets press man coverage with two deep safeties, he will typically convert his route to a "go" to get a stretch with the nearby safety between him and the post runner.

The inside receiver running the post has a relatively simple route. If the middle of the field is open (i.e. Cover two-deep) he just runs right down the middle of the field. If there is a deep middle safety (Cover 3, Cover 1) he will try to cross that defender's face as he heads for the opposite hashmark. This puts the safety in a bind. If he comes up, however, that receiver can still just head for the end zone.

Below is how that concept looks against Cover 2:



Below is the double-post concept against Cover 3:





Airraid Deep Cross

Below is how the Norm Chow and the old BYU guys and the Airraid types run this route.



Most of the routes here are self-explanatory, but a note on the route by the halfback (left back). It is an option route: he pushes to five yards, tries to "step on the toes" of the defender over him. If it is man and the defender is trying to guard him, he will slant in against outside leverage by the defender, or break out against inside leverage (usually out). If it is a zone and defenders try to bracket him, he will find the hole and just sit in it. Now, onto Norm Chow's reads in brief form:

Quarterback: Five-step drop; hitch-up in the pocket only if you need to.

Read: Eye the half-back (left runningback). Read half-back #1 in your progression, then the Y (deep crosser) #2.

QB and receiver must make eye contact vs. man. Against zone, receiver finds open grass. Only time quarterback will throw to the deep-crosser is if the Will linebacker and Mike linebacker (middle and outside linebackers) squeeze the half-back -- i.e. take the HB's option route away.

The Airraid guys read this basically the same, except they use a more pure progression: (1) Split-end on the "Go," (2) Y on the deep cross, (3) runningback on the option (sometimes just runs a basic flat route), (4) flanker on the square-in/dig route, and (5) other runningback in the flat as an outlet.

Otherwise the Cardinals and Airraid versions are the same: it is still a vertical stretch play; you still try to get the defense to defend deep and have the cross come underneath. The big difference is that, with the Cardinals version, you get a ton of frontside pressure with the two posts and the crosser. But if the weakside defenders -- safety, linebackers -- cheat and collapse down, you really need a different play.

With the Airraid version you have less frontside pressure, but on the backside you get a great combination between the deep-crosser and the backside deep in route. If the linebackers or safeties collapse on him as he heads up the field and breaks across, the backside flanker often comes quite open in the hole in the zone. Below is some video of Texas Tech running this route. Sorry if it is difficult to see, but that's often the nature of game cut-ups.(Hat tip: Hueytube)



Conclusion

It's a good play.

Airraid offense information, reading material, and passing concepts

This post is intended as a resource dump for links and items related to the "Airraid Offense," the pass-first offense devised by Hal Mumme and Mike Leach as a derivative of the old Lavell Edwards/Norm Chow/BYU offense. Other notable Airraid acolytes include coaches Chris Hatcher and Tony Franklin. And other notable coaches, including Sonny Dykes, Art Briles, and Mark Mangino, have all coached with Leach or Mumme and incorporate their concepts to varying degrees. At core, this article gives me something to link to every time I use the term "Airraid."

• Links from Bruce Eien's website: (A) Play and concept diagrams, (B) Explanation of the Airraid shallow cross concept, (C) "Airraid for High School" (quick diagrams of some core pass concepts).
  
  
• Playbooks: (A) 2000 Valdosta St (Chris Hatcher); (B) 1999 Oklahoma (Mike Leach); (C) 2001 Hoover High School (Rush Probst - HC; Tony Franklin client).
  
  
• Archive of Smart Football articles tagged as "Airraid."
  
  
• "Kentucky's Airraid Offense" - AFCA Clinic article by Chris Hatcher, Tony Franklin, and Guy Morris.
  
  
• Hal Mumme's Airraid Practice Plan
  
  
• Valdosta State's Passing Attack - Chris Hatcher article on the shallow and the mesh concepts.
  
  
• Chris Hatcher explains "60 out" -- outside comeback routes with the inside receivers on seam routes. (Hat tip: Spencer Hall and the Sporting News).
  
  
  
  
• "Spread 'em and Shred 'em" - Site dedicated to the Airraid
  
  
• Running the Airraid at a small high school - Coaching Article by Neil Weiner
  
  
• Official Tony Franklin System Site
  
  
• "Leach and Tech Flying High" - Article by Bob Davie on Texas Tech's offense
  
  
• "Quarterback's reading is done on field at Texas Tech" - Washington Post article
  
  
• "Coach Leach Goes Deep, Very Deep" - Profile of Mike Leach for the New York Times Magazine by the always excellent Michael Lewis.
  
  
• "Running Back Routes in the Airraid" - American Football Monthly article by Hal Mumme
  
  
• Coach Huey's Xs and Os site (Registration required) - Lots of experienced coaches; use the "search" feature for Airraid and one will find multitudes of information
  

Below are the major Airraid/BYU concepts combined with Norm Chow's reads for each. Note that this more closely hews to the original BYU version than the Airraid version, which has slight differences. If you can't figure out the differences after reading all of the above, then heaven help you. (Thanks to Bruce Eien for some of the diagrams.)

61 Y OPTION




5 step drop. Eye Y and throw it to him unless taken away from the outside by S/S (then hit Z), OR inside by ILB (then hit FB). Don’t throw option route vs. man until receiver makes eye contact with you. Vs. zone – can put it in seam. Vs. zone – no hitch step. Vs. man – MAY need hitch step.

62 MESH



5 step drop. Take a peek at F/S – if he’s up hit Z on post. Otherwise watch X-Y mesh occur – somebody will pop open – let him have ball. Vs. zone – throw to Fullback.

63 DIG



5 step drop and hitch (7 steps permissible). Read F/S: X = #1; Z = #2; Y OR HB = #3.

64 OUT



5 step drop. Key best located Safety on 1st step. Vs. 3 deep look at F/S – if he goes weak – go strong (Z = #1 to FB = #2 off S/S); if he goes straight back or strong – go weak (X = #1 to HB = #2 off Will LB). Vs. 5 under man – Y is your only choice. Vs. 5 under zone – X & Z will fade.

65 FLOOD ("Y-Sail")



5 step drop and hitch. Read the S/S. Peek at Z #1; Y = #2; FB = #3. As you eyeball #2 & see color (F/S flash to Y) go to post to X. Vs. 2 deep zone go to Z = #1 to Y = #2 off S/S.

66 ALL CURL



5 step drop and hitch. On your first step read Mike LB (MLB or first LB inside Will in 3-4). If Mike goes straight back or strong – go weak (X = #1; HB = #2). If Mike goes weak – go strong (Y = #1; Z = #2; FB = #3). This is an inside-out progression. NOT GOOD vs. 2 deep 5 under. (See my article on this route here.)

67 CORNER/POST/CORNER ("Shakes")



5 step drop and hitch. Read receiver (WR) rather than defender (Corner). Vs. 2 deep go from Y = #1 to Z = #2. Vs. 3 deep read same as “64” pass (Will LB) for X = #1 or HB = #2. Equally good vs Cover 2 regardless if man OR zone under. (See my article on this route here.)

68 SMASH



5 step drop and hitch. Vs. 2 deep look HB = #1; FB = #2 (shoot); Z = #3. Vs. 3 deep – stretch long to short to either side. Vs. man – go to WR’s on “returns”.

69 Y-CROSS/H-Option



5 step drop - hitch up only if you need to. Eye HB: HB = #1; Y = #2. QB & receiver MUST make eye contact vs. man. Vs. zone – receiver finds seam (takes it a little wider vs. 5 under). Only time you go to Y is if Will LB and Mike LB squeeze HB. If Will comes & F/S moves over on HB – HB is “HOT” and will turn flat quick and run away from F/S. Otherwise HB runs at his man to reinforce his position before making his break.

Video clips

Below is an assortment of video clips of the offense. Nothing too technical. You should be able to recognize the concepts nonetheless.

The case for Tim Tebow going pro and foregoing his senior season

This is rank speculation built on a foundation of conjecture, but, the more I think about it, the more I think that there is a decent case to be made for Tebow to go pro now rather than come back for his senior year.



First, I have no idea what kind of pro player Tebow will make. He's obviously one of the best and most accomplished college players in recent history. But what would he gain exactly by coming back, comparing to what he might gain (or lose) by leaving early?

By coming back he could win the Heisman (he has one), a National Championship (he has two), or he could just "enjoy the college experience." Though I imagine if Tebow says that he'll have something different in mind than Matt Leinart did when he offered that reason. (Leinart took a single music class his senior year, but presumably kept an otherwise busy schedule.) Tebow also might be able to improve his draft stock by improving his footwork and decision-making skills.

But why not just work on those things in the pros? It's unlikely that Tebow would be able to suddenly vault into being a first or even second rounder next year, particularly since Florida is not exactly going to change the gameplan. And if he wants to work on things like his footwork, reads, and learning the contours of an NFL offense, why not do it in the NFL? Many of the current starting quarterbacks all had significant apprentice time on a roster, and I think we all expect Tebow to work rather diligently at improving once he is there. And he does have some physical tools. I mean, he could hire some quarterback gurus and tutors for the offseason (he would be doing that anyway), but once in the NFL he would be able to work for a couple of years on nothing but the things that might make him a successful NFL QB.

Another factor is his mediocre draft grade. Although at first blush this seems like a disadvantage, my guess is that that whoever actually does draft him will do so because they see potential in him. They probably too will know a thing or two about developing quarterbacks. (Maybe Urban's good buddy Bill Belichick will take a flyer on the kid? Worked for Matt Cassel.) So he might land in a great situation where he'd be able to work on his game and develop.

The biggest possible disadvantage I'd see for Tebow is that, if he is only projected to be a fourth through sixth rounder this year, by leaving he might lose an opportunity to leap into the second or third round next year where he'd make significantly more money. But something tells me that is not the sort of thing driving him. And in any event, that's a speculative reason; his draft grade could also remain the same.

Finally, one factor plays a part with Tebow that normally wouldn't with other quarterbacks, but often does with runningbacks: hits and shelf life. NFL runningbacks have a limited shelf-life, before their skills and ability quickly diminish. The common wisdom is that this is a factor of the hits and punishment their bodies take. Tebow, unlike most future pro quarterbacks, takes many hits like a runningback; indeed, he often delivers them. It's a crude measure, but compare the total carries by Tebow to Texas Tech's quarterback, Graham Harrell, over the last two seasons. (In college "carries" includes sacks.) In 2007 and 2008, Harrell had 79 total "carries." Tebow? 386. Adding another 200 carries, sacks, and other hits might just start to wear on his body. And we all know NFL guys will be trying to hit him hard and often when he gets there, so body preservation might be reason alone.

So there it is. I'd bet that he comes back, but it's worth considering some reasons why he might not. The biggest is to get in the right situation with the right coaches. I mean, this afternoon we have Jake Delhomme playing against Kurt Warner, two guys who made their careers by beginning as backups and developing once they were in the league (or in the Arena league or NFL Europe). Leinart? He's on the bench.

Update: Well, Tebow is coming back.

Smart Notes - January 10, 2009

1. Air Yards. I want to highlight one of my favorite new stats: Air yards, as developed by Advanced NFL Stats:

If football were a brand new invention, and we had to decide how to credit the various amounts of yards gained to various players, how would we do it? If I said, "There's this kind of play called a pass, in which a thrower passes the ball to a another player who then runs with it as far as he can. I say we credit all the yards run by the receiver to the thrower." You'd say I was nuts.

I'd say, "Well, it takes a special kind of talent for a passer to get a lot of yardage after the catch (YAC). I won't be able to prove it, in fact, I won't have any evidence for that statement at all, but I still think our primary measure of a passer should include all those yards." I'd be laughed at.

Here are the QBs from 2007 who led the league in percent of their passing yardage as YAC: Croyle, Testaverde, Greise, Harrington, Favre, McCown, Losman, and Lemon. The 2006 list includes Brunell, Carr, Favre, (Rob) Johnson, and (Alex) Smith. There's isn't a single guy on that list who we can call a legitimate starter.

The 2008 season's list of leaders in %YAC include Cassel, O'Sullivan, Campbell, Favre (again), Losman, and Wallace. But Matt Cassel is good, right? Maybe not. Keep in mind how good the team around him was. He was handed the keys to a Ferrari. If a QB racks up his passing yards with YAC, he's either throwing lots of short check-downs and screens, or he has spectacular receivers--or both. Neither is necessarily an indication of a particularly skilled passer.

If we throw away all the YAC and look underneath, what do we have left? I call it Air Yards (AY). It's the distance forward of the line of scrimmage a pass travels. Although it's not a perfect measure of a passer, I think it makes a lot more sense than crediting Donovan McNabb with 71 yards and a touchdown for a 1-yard screen pass to Brian Westbrook.

I agree with this. It's just one measure, and of course accuracy does help lead to more YAC and even screen passes take some athleticism and dexterity to pull off, but the analysis here indicates that we should not give QBs too much credit.

The other reason I like it is because it heightens accountability for yards after catch yards for receivers. If receiver X gets a lot of YAC and receiver Y doesn't, it might be a function of the offense they play in or the types of routes they run, but you nevertheless get a way to compare receivers and put the burden on them: either he's getting yards after the catch or he isn't, and the team should play a guy who gets them. Now, part of Brian's analysis here seems to indicate that it is QBs who drive this as much as anything else -- if a QB can't complete it downfield he'll inflate YAC all around with dump-offs. But, as I said, it's a fascinating statistic as a way to unpack yards per attempt, which is still the best overall metric of a passing offense.


2. Assorted Links

• Dan Shanoff tells us what was hot or not in 2008.
  
  
• Utah 's Attorney General is considering some kind of anti-trust challenge to the BCS. The Wall Street Journal Law Blog explains.
  
  
• Florida won the BCS? Not so, says some computers. Texas beat USC, 505 victories to 496.
  
  
• Pro Football Reference Blog with an interesting proposal for NFL overtime.

3. Favicon. Smart Football now has a "favicon." We're doing it real big over here.

Smart Notes - Florida wins the BCS edition

Florida wins, 24-14. A few thoughts:

• In the first half, I thought Tebow consistently misread his keys on option plays. (Though this was only having viewed it once; a second view of the tape often reveals many things.) Oklahoma's defense seemed to be designed to take away the running backs and let him keep it. Maybe he just wasn't used to that kind of strategy, but when they ran the inside veer he kept giving it to the running back who would then be crushed by the man he was reading, and similarly on the speed or outside two-man option plays, the defense keyed almost exclusively on the running backs but Tebow kept pitching it. In the second-half, of course, Tebow kept the ball far more often and gashed the OU defense. (The announcers incorrectly said that in the second half the coaches were "calling Tebow's number," though they might have told him to keep the ball more on his options.) After Tebow kept it a few times, when he did let the runningback keep it, someone like Harvin had more room to then romp for big gains.
  
  
• Bob Stoops was absolutely correct when he went for it on fourth and one. He didn't get, but he did have Florida pinned down. The fact that they managed to get out with a big run is irrelevant to the decision whether to go for it or not. We can discuss the play-call as a separate matter.
  
  
• Overall, the game seemed there for Oklahoma's taking in the first half. Florida wasn't playing that well, OU ran the ball consistently and had a few big passes, and they got down into the red zone. I already mentioned the fourth down, but it should also be noted that both of Bradford's interceptions (including the one in the second half) were in his receivers' hands before they landed in the hands of Florida people.
  
  
• The headlines already read "Oklahoma offense at fault in defeat." Well, yes, they didn't score that many points, and I agree that at times the offense lacked identity. And much has already been made about the slowness of their no-huddle tempo. I agree that they probably spent too much time in their check-with-the-sidelines no-huddle, rather than the faster version where they just get a play and go. The TV views are always bad, but I thought Florida disguised well and didn't give away too much that you'd learn from the sideline or the booth. Insofar as reliance on that look was a crutch or conveyed timidity by OU, I don't know. They used both speeds all year, and no coach is clairvoyant in the weeks leading up to a game. But, it was just a tough, well-fought game. And people shouldn't be surprised when these great offenses play each other and the game winds up being somewhat low scoring; since both good offenses hang onto the ball for awhile, they both eat up clock and eat up the number of possessions both teams would normally get.
  
• That said, although I thought OU's pass protection was not bad, whenever there was a breakdown it always seemed to come right up the middle. OU's tackles did a fine job, but I'm not sure I can say the same for their interior three linemen.
  
• Florida used all their run game staples, but they also ran a lot of a play I didn't exclusively cover recently: the shovel triple-option, also known as the "crazy" or "shovel triple-option." See the post immediately below this one for more on it.
  

Urban Meyer's "Crazy" or Shovel Triple-Option

One play that Urban Meyer has used for years but that I did not extensively cover in my magnum opus on Meyer's offense was the "crazy option," or the shovel triple-option. I already heard some announcers and talking heads saying this was a "new play." No: I explained the play back in 2005. But I may as well use this opportunity to do so with a bit more clarity.

As a bit of background, Meyer has run this play since he was at Utah and actually was one of the first to incorporate the backside guard pulling for a type of "power-O" blocking with it. But, before we even attribute it to Meyer, Nebraska used to run this from the shotgun during their option heyday in the mid-1990s. Though a lot of people ran this play: I remember seeing that powerhouse of innovation, Alabama under Mike DuBose, run this play too. So it's just a good, sound play.



The quarterback takes the snap and attacks the end man on the line of scrimmage, typically the defensive end. If the defensive end comes up for him or rushes hard, the quarterback will shovel pass it to the inside player; here, the "H-back."

The backside guard pulls and leads up into the gap; the shovel receiver should follow him into the hole and cut off his block.

If the defensive end crashes down for the shovel man, the quarterback keeps the ball and attacks the outside. The runningback's job is to get into a "pitch relationship" with the QB (five yards outside and one to two yards back) and be ready. The quarterback will pitch off the next defender that shows (usually the strong safety or outside linebacker, though sometimes the free safety). If they take the pitch man the quarterback keeps it.

Below is a video of Florida running this play earlier this year against LSU, though in this clip there is a jet-sweep fake going the other way to get some early snap deception.

Smart Football's Guide to the BCS Championship

Okay, so it's not really a guide at all, but instead just some stuff I've previously written that happens to have some tenuous link to the title matchup between Oklahoma and Florida.



1. Rhythm Nation: Auburn Hires Gus Malzahn. Money quote:

Is Chizik Trying to Copy Oklahoma?

So, you can see why this might be appealing to Auburn, even with a defensive minded head coach. As Dr Saturday recently pointed out, "only Oklahoma's 1,036 total plays bested the Hurricane's 1,007 this year, though TU led the nation in yards per play." I think this is no coincidence.

Oklahoma too has a fairly basic system as far as schemes go. They don't do anything that a lot of teams don't. Their passing game is kind of a derivative of what they did under Mike Leach and Mark Mangino, but they have gotten away from the pure faith of the Airraid and now use a lot of rather traditional (meaning, common) concepts. Labeling them spread, pro, multiple, or whatever is a bit futile. (When asked what offense Oklahoma runs, Bob Stoops said simply: "The Oklahoma offense."). They use both the "I" and other traditional sets, though are probably still more "spread" than anything else. But before people jump down my throat, I note that I think Wittgenstein was accurate when he said most arguments boil down to people's different uses of labels and language, in this case what spread or pro means to one person versus another.

Kevin Wilson, OU's offensive coordinator, is not known as a passing guru, and few would confuse him with one. But he knows one thing extraordinarily well: the no-huddle up-tempo offense. He ran it at Northwestern with Randy Walker, and that's how OU killed people this year. They have all these great athletes, they have solid schemes, and they go so fast they mow you down. I have to think Chizik envisions this kind of result.

2. The Urban Meyer/Florida Gator Offense. Money quote:

Just click the link already.

3. Discussion of OU's drubbing of Texas Tech. Money quote:

Further, [one] storyline is that Stoops, Venables, and others basically have Leach's number, they've figured his out, and don't expect all that stuff to work against them. Stoops even reinforced this storyline after the game, by noting that most games between Tech and OU haven't been close. But this too is overblown. The game wasn't a referendum on the offense, it was a battle between two teams. OU clearly has a talent advantage of some kind, and although the offense didn't do nearly enough to even approach winning, it was only a few bad drives before the game was 21-0 and was basically out of reach.

That said, there's a kernal of truth to Stoops' theory about knowing that offense. As I've pointed out before, Leach ran his offense at OU exactly how he wanted. If OU does "get" Leach's offense, he doesn't get it in a way that another team could just pop in the tape and pick up. The Airraid, as much as it is certain schemes -- and no doubt OU's defense sat in zone a lot of the night working on their ability to pattern read the traditional Airraid concepts -- but the Airraid is an approach to football as much as it is an offense. If the OU guys have this heightened familiarity, it's not just schemes, it's knowing how Leach runs a practice, how they practice screens, indeed, how he approaches the game. Again, I don't think OU has the offense or Leach figured out once and for all (I mean, Tech did beat OU the year before and scored over thirty on them), but I can't completely discount this.

4.What does (should) it mean to be crowned National Champion?(Another self-explanatory one).

5. Probabilities, Pragmatism, and Football. Money quote:

"They say statistics are for losers, but losers are usually the ones thinking that. Statistics are great. Our whole game plan is based off statistics. Our management of the game is based off statistics. Our recruiting is based off statistics. Everything we do is analyzed. Is that the bottom line? No. You can't analyze the heart of Tim Tebow." - Urban Meyer

6. Auburn's offense might be bad, but don't call it the spread, the Airraid, or the Tony Franklin System. Money quote:

To highlight the absurdity of this situation, let's think of the last time a big name school hired an offensive coordinator to run the Hal Mumme offense: Bob Stoops, when he went to Oklahoma from the U of Florida, hired Mike Leach as his offensive coordinator. Why? Well as defensive coordinator with Florida, Stoops said that they only team that had an incommensurate level of success against them was Kentucky. Stoops noted that UF's talent level was far superior, yet stopping Kentucky was maddening for Stoops. So Stoops said: I want that.

Compare this to what is happening with Tuberville and Franklin. Back in 1999, Stoops hired Leach and gave him free rein to install his offense. (In fact, I have a coaching clinic talk where Stoops said that he ordered Leach not to change anything that first year, because he wanted exactly what he saw with Kentucky.) And who was Leach's QB at OU? A noodle-armed guy named Josh Heupel. And their receivers were a bunch of converted running backs and defensive backs. Yet I didn't hear the same cry that "Oh, we'll spread it out when we get the athletes." (News flash: if that's your approach, it'll never happen.) Now, I also observe that Stoops too wasn't entirely comfortable being a spread it all the time guy, and Leach happily went on to Texas Tech where he could be as much of a mad scientist as he liked. Yet OU stuck with the exact same system the next year with Mark Mangino as OC, and won a National Title. But Stoops knew what he was getting when he hired Leach, and most importantly he let him do it.

7. Not me, but everyone should read EDSBS's Orson Swindle on Rick Reilly's status as walking gag-reflex inducer. Money quote:

Tough call, but I gotta go with

Also, we never read Reilly growing up and don’t read him now, since he largely comes from the school of hackneyed one-liners (occasionally scoring) and the aesthetic of Mitch Albom’s School for Guys Who Ponder the Beauty of Life, Put One Hand on Cheek, and Lean On Said Hand Wistfully.

Looking forward to the game.

What does (should) it mean to be crowned "National Champion"?

There is much debate now whether Utah or Texas ought to share in the college National Championship in some way, though it is unlikely that they actually will). From the WSJ's Daily Fix:

[I]n an open letter to the 72 members of the media who choose the Associated Press No. 1, the Washington Post’s John Feinstein makes a strong case for them to place undefeated Utah at the top of their ballot.

“The reason to vote for Utah is simple: This is the one and only way you can stand up to the BCS bullies — the university presidents, commissioners, athletic directors and the TV networks who enable them — and, to renew a catch phrase, just say no,” Feinstein argues. “Say no to this horrible, hypocritical, feed-the-big-boys system. Say no to the idea that fair competition doesn’t matter. Say no to all the hype surrounding the power conferences and power teams. To co-opt yet another catch phrase, say yes to change.”

Feinstein isn’t the only one who thinks Utah didn’t get a fair shake at the national championship. Yahoo Sports’ Dan Wetzel agrees, pointing out that some voters in the Harris Interactive poll, which determines the title-game participants, admit they didn’t see the Utes play at all this season. “Even by the absurd standards of the BCS, having voters not bother to watch an undefeated team play a single game is a new low,” Wetzel writes. “Whether Utah deserved to be ranked No. 1, 2 or 25 isn’t the point of this argument. The Utes deserved to have voters at least see them.”

But not all agree:

Gregg Doyel disagrees that Utah deserves to be No. 1. “People, please. Utah is the same team that beat Michigan 25-23. Michigan went 3-9 this season,” he writes at CBS Sports. “Utah is the same team that beat Air Force 30-23. Air Force went 8-5. Utah beat Weber State 37-21. Weber State isn’t even in Division I. Utah beat New Mexico 13-10. New Mexico went 4-8.”

I'm not sure if, given a vote, I would vote Utah #1, but Doyel's argument seems bizarre to me. There's a lot of weaknesses with arguing that, because, say, USC beat the Citadel by 20, while Ohio State only beat then by 10, then USC is better. And his argument is just a series of those assertions. I mean, that kind of thing happens all the time and no one believes those predictions because they are entirely unhelpful. All the time one team gets blown out only to turn around and beat a team that blew out the team that originally beat them. Some teams just match up differently; football teams are complex, and some just match up with others better. To paraphrase Herm Edwards, it's about who won. Nevertheless, we saw some of this reasoning this year with Oklahoma and Texas, where Texas's win over Oklahoma eventually counted for less than the subjective impressiveness of Oklahoma's victories down the stretch.

But, more fundamentally, all this made me wonder what the designation "National Champion" is supposed to capture, anyway. The baseline that everyone -- including the President-elect -- seems to push for is a playoff. So we can use that to ask about each view.

Doyel's argument seems to be that Utah doesn't deserve to be #1 because -- "People, please" -- you wouldn't really expect them to beat Texas, OU, or Florida, right? I mean, just look at all their bare victories over mediocre or mid-level teams. In other words, one could phrase the Doyel view as the "National Champion" is the team that you think is the absolute best team in the sense that, were they to be matched up against any other team in the country, they would always be favored to win.

That can't be right, though. That's not at all what a single-elimination playoff gives you. Had the 2007 Giants played the 2007 Patriots the week following the Giants' Super Bowl win, would Eli and Co. suddenly have become the favorite? I think not. In March Madness, with teams playing every couple of days, do we really think that the better team always wins each game? No, and that's kind of the point of a playoff.

Indeed, series-based playoff systems, like with MLB or the NBA, are presumably based on the very idea that one-game is not enough to determine the best team. So, if we still think the playoff is the best solution, then it makes no sense to say that Utah can't be the National Champion just because you think the other teams might actually be better overall. Though, if you subscribe to the Doyel view of "National Champion," then the BCS probably does a better job for you than a playoff would, because the system is all about crowning the perceived best overall team. Although it lacks the precision of a playoff, it gives you fudge-factors so that Florida's and Oklahoma's (though not Texas's) losses can be overlooked.

So, maybe instead of crowning as National Champion the best team in absolute terms, that distinction is a reward for having the best overall season. I don't really watch racing, but that seems to be what they go for with their points system. And many BCS defenders say that it makes "every week a playoff," so the best overall season gets rewarded (let's just pretend like that is true). Well, a playoff doesn't give you that either: Exhibit A - the 2007 New England Patriots. They played unbelievably all year, blew everyone out, and then lost. No one -- not even them -- tried to argue that they should get a share of the Super Bowl via media vote or whatnot.

And that sort of thing happens all the time in playoff systems. It seems like a lot of the recent Super Bowl winners haven't been that great overall, or certainly were not considered the best teams going into the playoffs. Even when the Colts won the Super Bowl, it was with arguably their worst team in something like four or five years. Luck and circumstance play a huge factor, and again, the playoffs are decided by single, permanently binding, contests.

So what does a playoff give you, and why is it probably a better solution for crowning a National Champion? Let me say first that I think it would be a better system than the current BCS morass. But the advantage the playoff gives you is not anything metaphysically correct. It probably does not crown the best team. And it does not reward the best season (sorry Utah).

It merely gives you relative certitude. It's not perfect -- some clunker teams can be crowned, some historically great teams will get the relative shaft -- but, before the season, during the season, and in the playoffs, everyone knows what it takes to be the champion: you must get into the playoffs, and you must win every game once you're there. The Patriots couldn't lobby for votes, they couldn't say that they got jerked around, and they even couldn't say that they didn't get their chance. They played and they lost. They were probably better, they might only have had a bad day, but hey, you knew what you were getting into.

Which is really the issue here. No one has any idea what being "National Champion" ought to mean -- especially in college football where you have over a hundred D-1 programs and no team can come close to playing all the others. A playoff would simply lay some ground rules people could follow. As it stands, without a playoff, everyone may mount their high horse and argue past each other.

Update: Rocky Top Talk and the good Senator both weigh in on this issue. And Bill James says that all self-respecting statiscians should boycott the BCS, because the computer side of the BCS is irrational, incomprehensible, and, worse still, used only to justify the coaches poll: "Throughout the 11 years of the BCS, whenever the 'computer' rankings have diverged markedly from the polls, the consensus reaction has been, we have to do something about those computers. And they have; whenever the computer rankings don't jibe with the 'human polls,' they fix the computers."

Probability, Pragmatism, and Football

I recommend Joe Nocera's recent New York Times Magazine piece on the failures of Wall Street's risk models and overall risk management. It's a worthwhile read of its own right. But I see a football angle.

I've long been a proponent of more rigorous analysis of football, and in particular its associated probabilities. But -- and this is why I am posting this article here -- football is simply so complex that there are limits to our current understanding. With baseball and the "sabermetric" movement, there are attainable gains: the game can be modeled largely as batter versus pitcher, and, within this dynamic, there is only so much change and a finite number of extra variables to control.

With football, however, you have twenty-two players, a variety of formations, receivers, combination blocks, movements, and areas to defend. The game itself follows a dizzying path to completion, with score changes, possessions, downs, field positions, yards to first down, and so on. It's not impossible to model, and there is much we can and have learned, but with football -- as with Wall Street -- what appears certain in your models and statistics may not tell the full story.

"Statistics are like bikinis. What they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital." - Aaron Levenstein

And, I am sorry to say, that when I read this article I did not think of the excellent work being done that is very useful to coaches and real practitioners, but instead of one group in particular: Football Outsiders. Now, I don't want to be too harsh. They do some great, interesting work, they have illuminated a number of subjects, and, if nothing else, the sheer breadth of what they have addressed will pave the way for more sophisticated analysis. And maybe criticism is unfair, as much of their current stuff is not focused on real football or what might bring real knowledge to the game, but instead on aiding the fantasy football player.

This is understandable, since fantasy football provides ready benchmarks and fantasy footballers are a much broader and more accessible audience than are football coaches. But if we want to be honest about what we're doing, then, to me, we ought to be honest that many of these statistics are for fans and do not actually help anyone (coaches, players, GMs) make decisions.

Football Outsiders' big stat is called DVOA, or Defense-adjusted Value Over Average. It's a nice stat, and certainly it is an improvement over just trying to compare Jimmy and Joe based on their total yards or yards per carry or whatever else. But it's a bit of a fan's statistic, and, further, there's a tendency to adjust it and use it in a way that reinforces what we already know. If DVOA doesn't tell us that Tom Brady and Peyton Manning are the best quarterbacks, then it gets revised until it does, or is rejected until a different measure tells us this unassailable truth. Same with teams: DVOA helpfully tells us that the 2007 Patriots, 1999 Rams, and 1996 Packers were all very good. And, all too often, as Brian of Advanced NFL stats has observed, Football Outsiders far too often "use[s] statistics like a drunkard uses a light post, for support rather than illumination." (Quoting Mark Twain). (One exception: Mike Tanier, though at times his analysis is a bit shaky, is clearly coming into his own and the fact that he has access to NFL film and his practice and diligence is starting to show through.)

Don't get me wrong, I adore statistics and, even more than stats, I think probabilities are the key to understanding almost everything about the world around us. I don't like dealing in absolutes. (Though some seem to vigorously disagree with me when I say that.) If I have to choose between what can only be referred to as the neaderthal view:

"We don't worry about numbers here. Statistics are for losers. I'm not a stat guy. I'm not interested in them, because you can do anything you want with numbers, you can manipulate them, and work around with them. Look at all the financial [problems] we're having in Wall Street right now. That's all those guys lying and playing with numbers. And now all of us are suffering. So I don't believe in numbers, because any crook can play with numbers....It angers me. You know? That's the whole thing, people play with numbers."

- Washington Redskins defensive coordinator Greg Blache

And what I consider the modern view:

"They say statistics are for losers, but losers are usually the ones thinking that. Statistics are great. Our whole game plan is based off statistics. Our management of the game is based off statistics. Our recruiting is based off statistics. Everything we do is analyzed. Is that the bottom line? No. You can't analyze the heart of Tim Tebow."

- Urban Meyer

Then clearly put me in the modern camp. So I really don't mean to denigrate the work of Football Outsiders or anyone else doing progressive work -- we certainly need more of it. Coach Blanche brings up the financial crisis, but it's not like -- even there, where the problems have been widespread -- that numbers and stats can just be dismissed out of hand. They are still useful, but you embrace the limitations: even if your statistics are imperfect, they are often better than nothing, and you must simply recognize and be aware of where the pratfalls are in how they might aid or hinder your decisionmaking. This was lost on the finance world recently, but it applies equally to football decisionmaking.

And, because I also consider myself something of a pragmatist, I nevertheless ask of those doing this work is the same question I would ask of any other idea (because the value of football statistics is simply another permutation of an idea about the value of statistics):

Pragmatism asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"

- William James, Pragmatism (1907).

So to me, there's a grand opportunity for these statisticians to change the way decisions are made and overall just improve the game -- to make a "concrete difference." Some statisticians have done this, most notably David Romer. His work is so far thorough, practical, and challenging.

I'm not a true statistician or econometrician. And, as I said above, one of the difficulties with doing real, relevant football statistics is that the game is quite complex, and one needs to understand it to model it (and those who understand usually can't model, and those who can model usually don't understand). One of my goals with this site is to try to help bridge this gap.

Nocera's piece begins with this quote from Peter Bernstein's book, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk.

The story that I have to tell is marked all the way through by a persistent tension between those who assert that the best decisions are based on quantification and numbers, determined by the patterns of the past, and those who base their decisions on more subjective degrees of belief about the uncertain future. This is a controversy that has never been resolved.

And it will remain controversial -- in finance as well as football -- because the future will be paved by numbers and judgment, marching, somewhat awkwardly, hand in hand.

Links of the Moment

1. "NFL kickers missed 700% more PATs in the 70s."

2. News Flash: Sports prognosticators don't know anything you and I don't also (and preseason predictions are meaningless). Exhibit A (Good job, Mark May) (hat tip - Wiz of Odds):



3. Who were the luckiest teams in the NFL this season?

4. Utah deserves a quarter of the National Championship (or it should be ignored entirely).

5. Surprised Favre melted down this season? I wasn't, and neither was Advanced NFL stats. (Answer: in 2007 Favre's Green Bay receivers did much to make him look artificially good. This is an important article.)

6. High School team eschews punting (only punts twice for entire season) and wins state championship.

7. Texas Tech's Mike Leach on 60 Minutes: The Mad Scientist of Football

Colts-Chargers

Football -- and particularly the NFL -- is a percentages game. The storylines coming out of this game will be manifold, but to me it was quite simple.

• On the Colts side of the equation, they had the advantage in turnovers -- zero to the Chargers' two. That was huge for the Colts, and they probably would not have been in the game without that advantage.
  
  
• On the Chargers side, the Colts spent the entire game trying to start drives from what seemed like their own half-yard line. And we know that, when you have the ball far on your own end of the field -- even on first down -- your expected point value from the drive is negative: namely, the other team is still more likely to score than you are. So that was quite bad for the Colts.
  
  
• But those two effects sort of canceled each other out in this game. The final tiebreaking probability push was the coin flip, which in the context of overtime is a fifty-fifty gamble where the winner gets a +10% increase in their chance of winning in an otherwise evenly matched game: the team that wins the coin flip wins the game roughly 60% of the time. (And the situation we had in this game, where one team wins the coin-flip and wins it without the other teams' offense taking the field, happens about 30% of the time.)
  

For the Chargers, two out of three ain't bad.

Peyton's Favorite Pass Play: Levels

Peyton Manning just won Associated Press MVP of the NFL for the third time, and -- love him or hate him -- he's pretty decent at that whole throwing the ball thing. And this year he has done it without a lot of help, as he and offensive coordinator Tom Moore have had to put together their own particular brand of sorcery to generate yards, points, and wins. And they've done it.

In this article I want to discuss one of the Colts' favorite pass plays of the last several years, which they run as much as any other: the two-man levels concept.

Breakdown

Both Peyton and Tom Moore have both stated that their favorite pass route is one known in many coaching circles as "levels." (The Colts have their own unique lingo, but "levels" gives you the gist.) Most other pro teams use it too, including the Patriots, but no one does it as well or as often as the Colts. At the college level, Oklahoma State (Mike Gundy and Gunter Brewer) and Arkansas (Bobby Petrino) both use this concept with some regularity. And June Jones has used a three-man version of levels for some years at Hawai'i and now SMU.

The concept is simple: the outside receiver runs a five-yard in route, and the slot receiver or tight-end runs a ten-to-twelve yard square-in (with a slight outside release). On the backside, the Colts have the outside guy run a take-off (or sometimes a comeback at eighteen yards) and the backside slot or tight-end runs a "divide" or seam-read. As explained previously, the divide route involves a read by the receiver: against single-high defenses like Cover 3 (also known as middle of the field closed), the receiver keeps it up the hashmark in the open void in the seam; against middle of the field open defenses (like Cover 2), he will break on a post route into the open void in the middle.



The quarterback begins by "peeking" or getting an "alert" read of the divide route. If that route comes open or the safeties get out of position, the quarterback throws the ball on rhythm at the end of his drop for a big-play. If it is not open, he goes into his normal 1-2-3 progression.

Unlike most pass concepts which are read deep to short, this play is read short-to-deep. (Though with Peyton Manning -- who likely has an excellent idea of where he's going with the ball on every play -- the difference between "coverage reads" and "progression reads" is blurry.) But the philosophy of the play is to throw the five-yard in route whenever it comes open; they want to treat it like stealing yards and to get the ball into a playmaker. Traditionally this was Marvin Harrison, but more recently you'll see Reggie Wayne run this route play after play.

Broadly, if the defense comes up for the quick in route, the quarterback looks for the square-in behind him. In other words, this is a two-man high-low or vertical stretch concept, which puts the underneath defenders in a bind with a guy in front of and behind them.

More specifically, the play is designed to attack Cover 2. One of the most common routes against Cover 2 is the smash, which is a great route against that coverage. In that play, the outside receiver runs a five yard hitch, and the inside guy runs a corner route at twelve: this puts the cornerback in Cover 2 (who is responsible for the flat) in a high-low bind. Smash has been a go-to play for years, but it has become so common that safeties and inside defenders have learned to overplay the route.

Enter two-man levels. If we lay the smash and levels concepts on top of each other, we see that as the play develops the defense will not be able to tell the difference between them Finally, at the last minute the receivers break unexpectedly:


So the first thing you get with these two plays is the advantage of destroying pattern reading by making your routes look alike. But let's look at who the play is designed to attack in Cover 2: the outside linebacker/nickel back over the slot (coaches just refer to him as "#2"). In smash, the play is designed to attack the corner, so if he is going to get help it is likely to come from this inside defender.

In the diagram below we can see how that player is affected: if he stays home to attack that quick in, the square-in comes open in the void behind him. If he drops back to follow the slot man who releases vertically (which is often what he is taught by guys like Bob Stoops to deal with the smash) then the quick five-yard in should be open.


The last thing is if the middle linebacker (the middle underneath zone defender in a true Cover 2) flows over to take away either the square-in or the quick-in, then the quarterback will drop it off to the runningback underneath.

Now, the other way this play works well is against man. In that case, the outside receiver will try to run his route underneath the slot man such that he will get a rub (not a pick of course, those are illegal and no self-respecting offense would ever use them . . . ) and should come open right in the quarterback's vision.




Below is a diagram of how the Packers have used the play from trips. They use it a bit more as an inside hitting route. Both of the outside guys in trips run five yard in routes, and the inside guy runs his square-in at 10-12.



And below is video of the Packers running their version of levels.



Conclusion

So there you have it: the two-man levels with backside verticals. As with all pass plays, its efficacy is mostly determined by how well the team can pass protect. That said, it is a nice quick-pass, and even against zone-blitzes with three-deep and three underneath defenders the offense can usually find a quick void. It's a great play, but Peyton's continued success will likely hinge on whether his team can keep protecting him.