The Divide Route in the Multiple Smash Concept

The "smash concept" is extremely popular for a reason: It's a great route. And it is simple to teach. The concept is designed to defeat Cover Two in its many forms. As Cover Two has evolved (Tampa 2, "Tough Two" with the corners retreating to ten yards and jumping routes, and Cover Two-Man), the Smash has become more and more popular.

A word here about verbiage. I refer here to the "Smash concept" or the "Smash route." Both refer to a two-man combination with the outside receiver on a 6 yard hitch and the inside receiver on a 12 yard corner route. Some coaches and teams go further and actually refer to either the corner route or the hitch route as a "smash" route. Again, "smash" to me is the combination - i.e. the concept - rather than any individual route.




In any event, the quarterback has a progression read: (1) corner, (2) hitch underneath. In his progression read he will "key" the cornerback: If the cornerback sinks back to stop the corner route, throw the hitch; if he comes up for the hitch, throw the corner. The best way to describe this to a QB is that you have a progression read and you "read" your receivers. You simply "progress" from one to two. In doing this though you have to understand what guys you are "keying," as their reactions should determine your progression. A Quarterback must understand defenses and defender reactions, but at the same time there is no telling where those 11 guys on defense will go, and as long as he knows where his receivers are and if the QB and the receivers are all on the same page we can run a successful play. We tell him his general rule is to throw the corner route until they take it away (though by gameplan or defense you can tell him to always throw the hitch until they come up for it).

I won't belabor the details of coaching up the "smash" portion of the route itself. If you want to understand all the details in depth, I suggest this. See here too for more on the "multiple smash route." (Registration required) Broadly, the inside receiver will run a 12 yard corner route. He has no "reading" on the play, but he must know his techniques. First, he should identify whether it is man or zone. Against man he will need to close his defender's cushion, push or lean him slightly inside, and plant and break hard away from the defender. Against zone he wants to see who he is running the route off of. If there is a deep defender over him he must set this man up inside and jab at the post at 10-12 yards and break for the corner. If there is no one head up on him he will roll cut his route so he loses no speed. It's worth mentioning though that even if he jabs or plants and breaks we want this closer to a "speed cut," as we don't want him to lose too much speed. A receiver can do this best by "jabbing" while having his toes actually pointed where he wants to go and having his "plant" foot not outside the framework of his body. Young receivers too often step way outside their body frames with their toes pointed in the wrong direction.

The corner route will be caught between 22-25 yards downfield. The QB's job is to "throw him open": throw the ball into the open grass. The receiver must react to the ball and go and get it. Against man to man defense to the short side of the field the depth of the route will be 18-22 yards.

See the above linked article for more specifics, but we tell the outside guy he has two portions to his route. First, run a six-yard hitch route (five-steps - three big and two small), and (2) the "option" or "get open" part of his route. We simply want him to find the open spot. If the corner comes up in Cover 2 zone he will push to 6, turn inside, and work inside to the next zone hole.



If the corner is off and he turns and there is a flat defender inside, he just wants to get space from that guy. If that defender hangs the hitch receiver will drift away from him at his 5-6 yard depth as an outlet for the QB.



If the flat defender flies out to cover him he will break inside this player. We'd like him to actually climb over this flat defender because he will better be able to find the zone hole created but if the flat defender hangs back too far he will come inside slightly and settle underneath.



The Divide Route

This is all fairly straightforward stuff that most people do. The point of this article is to talk about adding a bit more of a big-play dimension to theSmash by using the "divide route," which in other coaches terminology may be a "seam read" or a "tube-read." Both the route and the "read" are simple.

The divide route involves a MOFO or MOFC read by the inside receiver. MOFO simply means "middle of the field open," or no deep middle safety. MOFC means "middle of the field closed," or is there a deep middle guy. The nice thing about this read for the "divide route" as opposed to some other contexts is that the route, hence the name, is simply about "dividing" the deep coverage and the receiver has a lot of freedom to find the downfield open grass. It's a deep stretch and it is designed to strike safeties who overplay the smash or simply get out of position.

Obviously the immediate strength of the divide route as shown is that if a two-deep safety to the smash side overplays the route, one can hit the post route for a big play. If you keep the go route on the backside (as diagrammed) and both safeties overplay the Smash side then the "Go" might be open for a big play. The simple reality is that a Cover 2 team really cannot cover this concept effectively.

Against a Cover 3 zone the QB's "peek" is the seam backside. Before the smash part of his progression, he wants to get the F/S moving and hit the seam.



Running the divide to the trips side is even more dangerous. Any team that tries to play Cover 2 to the trips side will struggle mightily. Many defensive coaches instruct their kids to simply check out of Cover 2 against a trips look. Observe that the "divide" principles governing that inside receiver tells him that he will run more of a "skinny" post here inside the Cover 2 safety to break the deep coverage but avoid the safety on the opposite hash. If there is no deep safety the receiver has lots of freedom.

This is because, again, the governing principle of the "divide route" (one reason I like to call it this instead of a "seam-read") is that you can largely just tell the receiver that he has the area between the hashmarks to work to find the deep open vertical grass. A more advanced technique applies if the defense drops super deep so that he cannot effectively "divide" defenders. This will be done by gameplan, but if that is the case we will essentially let him "throttle" down a bit in the voids and the QB will still look to throw it in the open grass, but simply in the open grass in front of those deep dropping safeties.

In any event, see below for how the divide route will work against MOFO and MOFC defenses.

Cover 2:



Cover 3:



Now, what if it is a MOFC defense but that free safety is flying over too much? Well now it's time to be a good Ball Coach and tag the inside receiver on a "middle-read" route. I have previously explained that route here. The similarity with the divide is a post route against MOFO. The difference is a square-in or cross against MOFC. So if that free safety flies over, he will cut inside that guy. Observe that this is the exact same principle we used for that outside hitch receiver.



Backside hitch

Here is a last aspect to the play that I am a big fan of. I think the play is very effective if you keep the backside player on a hitch, particularly in trips. This gives you a great look against any soft coverage. When you do this you ask your QB to be a ball player and get the ball to the backside receiver if the defense gives it. (In other words, it's probably soft Cover 3.) If it's not there he looks over to the smash side and works his normal progression: Peek at the divide route, then work the smash combination.



Conclusion

This is a simple, well designed play that is both a ball-control, high percentage play, but with the divide route and the corner route it has great big-play potential. If the defense plays soft you will take what they give you, but if they play any kind of two-deep or if their safety gets out of position you will make them pay.

What Killed the Run and Shoot?

Q: What killed the Run and Shoot? Why don't you see "the shoot" anymore in the NFL or major college football?

A: First, you have to distinguish between the "Run and Shoot" as a specific, delineated system, and the individual Run and Shoot "concepts" or routes. And I'm not just referring to spreading with four wide receivers. I'm referring to the specific "Choice," "Go," "Switch," and the broader design of the system.

The first answer is that even if the "the Shoot" is dead, the Concepts live. This is so whether any of their current benefactors would admit it (or, in some instances, whether they even realize they are using run and shoot concepts). Indeed, the concepts are here to stay. Mike Martz with the Rams and now the Lions consistently use forms of Choice and Switch. Petrino at Louisville (we shall see in Atlanta) has used a couple R&S concepts. Even Charlie Weis at Notre Dame uses a play very similar to the Georgia concept. Moreover, the famous four verticals so common today where the slot receiver reads the coverage to attack the seam or the deep middle was largely developed and expanded upon by the R&S. Everyone who seriously considers passing offense should study the Run and Shoot.

The Shoot as a specific, delineated system with the four wide receivers (or two split ends and two slots), a single back, half-rollouts, certain run plays, the protections, the screen, and the like was countered. Offenses responded and have disguised their run and shoot philosophies by calling them different things and showing different looks. There is nothing magical (or surreptitious) about that; it is the West Coast philosophy and it is a good one. The reason people question this is because, for a time, the Run and Shoot had nearly unparralleled success.

As the typical story goes, the zone blitz killed the R&S. The preface to this story is that for twenty years, the Run and Shoot did not get blitzed. Well, it did, but Run and Shoot teams (like the U of Houston) would score 60 or 70 on those teams, and the NFL teams that tried it would give up after a quarter or half touchdowns raining from the sky.

How do you employ a four-wide pass-happy attack that was blitz proof for twenty years? And then why did it suddenly get blitzed out of existence?

The history of the Shoot is a lesson to all offensive coaches, and this same principle can be applied by all manenr of offensive coaches, and is often applied by coaches like Joe Gibbs and teams like the Indy Colts in the use of Tight ends and H-Backs.

The R&S used the RB in the protection. The quarterback would do a half-roll to one side, the line would do a kind of sprint-out/turnback protection, and the runningback would often block the defensive end or end man on the line of scrimmage to the half-roll side. About 8-10 times a game, however, the running back would block the DE for a 1001 count, and then slide off and release for a screen pass as his linemen got downfield to block for him. Against an all-out blitzing team, no one covered him because he had already engaged a defender, so everyone assumed he was in the protection, they would rush upfield, and the runningback would release out into the open field.

It becomes a study in game theory and reading and reacting. So defenses responded to this tactic. They had to keep at least one safety or another defender back to spy the RB. Why does this mean no blitzing? If the RB is able to block the end man on the line of scrimmage while another player must sit back and not blitz, simply to see whether or not the RB releases on a screen. The net result was that R&S teams rarely, if ever, saw Cover 0 blitzing man defenses. They could always release four receivers, block with six (assuming their six could block the other teams' six) and not face any overload blitzes.

Enter the zone blitz. Back in his days with Texas A&M, Bob Davie was an innovator. Against run and shoot teams like the University of Houston, he would run his 3-4 defense, blitz his outside LBs (thus forcing the RB to stay in and block), and drop off defensive linemen and interior linebackers so he could still play zone with six to eight defenders. As a result the R&S's protection and formation scheme broke down. They blocked with six, had the running back on a bad matchup with a good OLB, faced an unblocked rusher, but the defense still had 6-8 guys in coverage, so the R&S's "hot reads" and breakoffs did not work either. The run and shoot finally had to adapt. Sure they could do things like certain quick breakoffs and other gadgets, but free rushers and seven guys in coverage was a losing battle for the QB.

So it was not merely "disguising coverages," (as Run and Shoot QBs and receivers were well coached and could still find the voids or the single man), or the blitzing (as shown above, Run and Shoot teams could defeat the blitz), it was the defensive combination of always being able to always get an unblocked rusher, eat the RB, and run a disguised zone that eventually rattled and slowed down the "pure" Run and Shoot.

So did the R&S die? In a sense. Even those who still swear by it, like Hawaii's June Jones, both do not run the same "Shoot" in exact form, have changed their protections, and remain bitterly secretive regarding the system, fearing another breakdown.

But in another, perhaps larger sense, the Shoot is stronger than ever. More teams and more teams use its concepts. And, for a "dead offense," it still stirs up quite a bit of discussion, no?