Assorted links and notes - May 13, 2009

1. Bring back the old Spurrier: “I used to think I was pretty good coaching quarterbacks,” Spurrier said.

2. The Department of Sporting Jurisprudence: Do you have a right to be punished when you commit an intentional foul in basketball late in games?

3. Holy A-11 batman! The ACC now allows less than seven men on the A-11? Yes and no. As the good Doctor explains, they still can't have more than four players in the "backfield" (i.e. anyone not on the line) -- the idea is to prevent penalties when the offense has only ten men on the field.

4. Let me just go ahead and say no: I spent a substantial amount of time this offseason researching Michigan's offense (the results of which are to published, but not necessarily on the web -- though I hope to eventually get it out here or elsewhere that can be linked to). I will admit that I went into it thinking that there was some looming structural/strategic problem with Rodriguez's offense -- that's just my bent. Players win games obviously but I like blaming coaches more, and in any event all coaches have to work with what they have. But I quickly decided that, yes, there were things for Rodriguez to work on, but the biggest thing for Michigan was just to find a quarterback, any quarterback really. And, though he is but a wee true freshman, and a rather wispy one at that, Tate Forcier does appear positioned to at least be better for Michigan and Rodriguez than anyone they had last year.

Which is why I found recent transfer Steven Threet's comments so surprising:

Threet said he has no indication what will happen in fall camp but figures the tipping point will be decision-making, which gives Sheridan a chance to play.

"I feel like Tate has a good opportunity coming in early with the extra reps in the spring and that should be beneficial," he said. "But Nick does a good job of executing the offense the way they want it to be run. People may point out the physical things Tate or Denard may have at a physical advantage, but a lot of time at quarterback in this system comes down to decision-making."

"Nick" here refers to Nick Sheridan, who was statistically the only quarterback in the Big 10 worse than Steven Threet (unfortunately neither could run, and both of course played for the same team). Brian Cook convulses at this thought, as no doubt he still has night terrors about last season:

I can't seriously believe Sheridan executes the offense the way the coaches want it to be run . . .

. . . unless Threet means they've given that side of the ball a cigarette and a blindfold. Sheridan's decision-making last year was not a strong suit. . . . Why am I even spending time on this? The chances Sheridan takes a snap over a healthy Forcier are 0.001%. Seriously, people.

I agree. Yet, Forcier could always get hurt, and what had been relegated to nightmares of 2008 could, Freddy Krueger-style, reenter the real world. (H/t mgoblog and Dr Saturday).

5. How much does passing predictability (i.e. the more likely it is that an offense will throw) affect the offense's success rates? Lots of wonky stuff at Advanced NFL stats, but the punchline: "Going from about 50% predictability to 90% predictability costs at least 1.0 Adj YPA." Read the whole thing.

6. Mike Leach interviewed by Bitter Lawyer. Breakdown: Law school had far fewer "gorgeous girls running around" than undergrad; although in law school he discussed contracts, they were "kind of like a Leprechaun. I had heard of them, but I hadn’t actually seen one"; he wants a 64 team playoff to replace the BCS, with the remaining teams playing in some kind of NIT substitute; and he actually comes across as rather normal in the whole piece. (H/t doubletnation).

Triple Shoot Part 2 - Run game and play-action

[Ed. Note: This is Part 2 of Manny Matsakis's presentation of his "Triple Shoot" offense. Check out the tripleshoot website here.]

Part 2 - Run Game and Play passes

The general makeup of the offense includes a run game, play passes, drop-back passing attack and exotics. The following is an overview of each area of the offense:

Run Game

This aspect of the offense is broken up into the Belly series, Trap series and Dive series. Our linemen work daily on their zone, veer, trap and double team blocks in order to maximize our consistency in rushing the ball.

The primary series of the offense is the Belly series, which is influenced by triple option (Hambone) and zone blocking. This was also complimented by a backfield action that I was able to glean from “Dutch” Meyers book, Spread Formation Football (albeit, he did this out of the shotgun) and some basic Wing-T concepts. The Belly series consists of the Pop Out (I have heard it also called the Jet or Fly Sweep) and the following dive plays, Veer and Zone as well as the change-up plays of the Option and Reverse. The key in executing each of these aspects of the Belly series is in the actual “ride” of the motion receiver by the QB and the subsequent fake or hand-off to the Superback, in order to draw attention to the potential Pop Out around the edge or the dive play to the back. Ideally, our Pop Out and dive plays will look the same for the first 3 steps and then become the actual play called prior to the snap of the ball. The change-up plays of Option and Reverse are designed to take advantage of fast flowing linebackers and defensive line slants.

Pop Out






Zone





Veer






Option





Reverse






Play Passes

The key to the play pass is that for the first three steps of the run series associated with it, the backfield and blocking must stay consistent (Bill Walsh). I know we are coming along when we stop the video at this point and we are not be able to tell if it is a run or a pass. Play Passes are called when the secondary is rolling or linebackers are so keyed-in to the run series that they disregard the potential of a pass over the top.

Our base play passes are executed off of our top run series, the Belly series. We practice two primary play passes, one to the front side (Wheel) and one to the backside (Switch). Regarding play pass protection, we put the Superback on the front side linebacker as we fake the Pop Out play and all the other linemen are aggressive in their execution of selling the run play.

Even Wheel

The Wheel is run out of our Even (balanced) formation and this play is good versus Nickel or Dime coverage. The play begins with the inside receiver coming in motion, the QB will then ride the receiver on a Pop Out fake as he turns to the oncoming receiver. The action will continue with a fake to the Superback. The QB will then set up just outside the play-side Guard and throw the Wheel combination. The QB will look to throw the ball to the Post first, then to the Wheel up the boundary. Often times the Wheel is thrown to the back shoulder of the receiver.

Receivers will take their first 3 steps (as if stalk blocking) and then break into their routes. The outside play-side receiver will break on a Post (5th Step) while the inside receiver will run through the breakpoint of the Post route.





Load Switch

The Switch route is run out of one of our trips formations (Rip or Load) and this play is also good versus Nickel or Dime coverage. The play begins with the number 3 receiver backside coming in motion for the Pop Out fake. The QB will simulate the same action as he did in Wheel. This time he will look backside to the Stretch route, which is running up inside the backside hash mark.

The two backside receivers will run the Switch combination on the backside in the following manner. The outside receiver backside will come first and get inside the hash mark at a point 7 yards up field while the number 2 receiver will run through the point where the outside receiver crossed his face and he will continue up the sideline. The outside receiver is responsible to read the deep zone defender over him. If that man is a Cover 3 safety, that defender may run downhill to tackle the Pop Out and if he does that, the receiver will continue on a thin post. If he stays high over the top, then the receiver will break his route flat at a depth of 12 yards to get open underneath the free safety. The Cover 2 conversion is predicated on the action of the backside safety. If he rolls to Cover 3, then the receiver will apply his Cover 3 rules. If he stays on the hash mark, the receiver will break it flat at 12 yards.

The QB will look to the backside Stretch route adjustment first and then to the route up the boundary. The boundary route is often times a back shoulder throw.




[Ed. Note. For more on the "switch" concept, see here.]

Play passes are often adjusted as we get through the season to take advantage of how defenses are geared up to slow down our Belly series.

Tomorrow, an overview of the dropback passing game.

- Manny Matsakis

John Madden knows more football than you

So says Residual Prolixity in reviewing Madden's book, One Knee Equals Two Feet: And Everything Else You Need to Know About Football:

Content-wise . . . it's clear that Madden knows a whole heck of a lot about football[.] There's more really good football content that shows off Madden's expert status in any given 10 pages than in half the books I've reviewed on here. One Knee is now 23 years old, and in that time about all the rules changes Madden has suggested have come to pass, and generally because they were quite sagacious. Some random examples of football knowledge: talking about the importance of the strength of a defensive lineman's fingers-Bear great Dan Hampton, whose knees were famously ravaged, didn't seem to mind all that much, saying "I'd rather have a knee go than my fingers." As just a casual watcher, I know hand play is important for linemen, but it's not something I notice regularly or pay a great deal of attention to, but reading something like that makes me want to bust out the tapes and compare, say, Haynesworth's precise play in the playoff game against the Steelers his rookie year versus this year. Another thing -- Madden's first job as head coach was leading the Raiders. He knew he didn't have enough experience at game management to be successful. He could try game-planning, but it's tough to simulate the same type of rhythm and unpredictability within structure. So, he attended local high school games in the Oakland area and basically called plays as though his team was in that situation-on 3&8 from the 34, how do I attack this team's defense. Simple, but a very effective strategy. . . .


. . . Still, this is one of the best couple books I've reviewed on this site. I originally read this as a library book, but I'll be ordering both a copy of this one for my library and a copy of Madden's first book as well. Not recommended for getting a sense of the modern game, but enthusiastically recommended for fans looking for an enjoyable book written by an expert and who can stand the dated factor.

The "Triple Shoot" Part 1 - History and overview

[Ed. Note: For the next four days regular -- or irregular! -- blogging will be suspended and in its place is an overview of Manny Matsakis's creation, the "Triple Shoot." The offense is a hybrid combination of a fly sweep offense and the run and shoot. Check out the triple shoot website. Again, the words below are Manny's, as he has been kind enough to write this out. Enjoy.]

Part 1 - Historical Perspective

It all started with a fascination of the 3 distinctly different offenses the Wing-T, Run & Shoot and the Georgia Southern Hambone. From there it evolved with specific influence and personal contact with the following coaches, Ben Griffith (Inventor of the Hambone), Glenn “Tiger” Ellison, Darrell “Mouse” Davis and Bill Walsh. As an additional note, Leo “Dutch” Meyer’s book, Spread Formation Football gave me an idea on how to create an explosive rushing attack (albeit, it was not the purpose of his book). Having started American Football QuarterlyÆ in 1993, while waiting to take a job at Kansas State University, gave me access to all of the aforementioned individuals, except coach Meyer.

In the early 1990’s, I was working on my Ph.D. and while finishing my coursework I began a research project, which evolved into the Triple Shoot Offense. The title of the dissertation project was, “The History and Evolution of the Run & Shoot Offense in American Football.”



Development of the Offense

Researching the state of football and developing axioms and creating postulates based on those axioms created this offense. My initial axioms of the game were as follows:

• 1. The game of football has freedoms, purposes and barriers that give spread formation attacks a distinct advantage.
  
  
• 2. A systems approach to football has the greatest potential for success over a period of time.
  
  
• 3. When players are more knowledgeable about their system than the opponent is theirs they have the greatest potential for success.
  
  
• 4. A balanced approach to offensive strategy has the greatest potential for success over a period of time.
  
  
• 5. A system that appears complex, yet is simple to execute will stand the test of time.

These following postulates were the results of analyzing the previous axioms:

• 1. Spreading the field with offensive personnel creates mis-matches and distinct angles to attack the defense.
  
  
• 2. Utilizing a no-huddle attack enables an offense to control the clock and give the players a better understanding of the defense they are attacking.
  
  
• 3. A 2-point stance by offensive linemen gives them better recognition and a lower “center of gravity” at the point of attack.
  
  
• 4. A protection based on the principle of “firm: front-side & soft: backside” enables an offense to take advantage of any defensive front by keeping them off balance.
  
  
• 5. Run blocking schemes that combine Veer, Zone and Trap blocking enables an offense to run the ball versus any defensive front.
  
  
• 6. Pass schemes that adjust routes based on coverage on the run will open up holes in the secondary.
  
  
• 7. Quarterback decisions based on looks & reads give the offense the ability to release the ball anywhere from 1 to 5 steps. This will minimize the amount of time necessary for pass protection.

Triple Shoot Offense Defined

The Triple Shoot Offense is a systems oriented, no-huddle, four receiver, one back attack that is balanced in its ability to run or pass the ball at any time during a game. It is predicated on spreading the field and attacking a pre-ordered defense with blocking and route adjustments after the play begins.

Ordering Up The Defense

The concept of “ordering up the defense” is one that I learned from “Tiger” Ellison. His concept was to place a label on each defensive man (numbering), and from that to designate a specific defender that would tell his players what to do, either by the place he lined up before the ball was snapped or by his movement after the snap.

The Triple Shoot Offense took that information and decided to look at defensive alignments based on the way they matched up to a 4 receiver, one-back formation and designated defenses as either Nickel, Dime, Blitz or they were considered unsound. Nickel looks are based on six men in the box with one free safety, Dime looks have five men in the box with two safeties and Blitz is recognized when there are seven defenders in the box and no safety over the top. Anything else is an unsound defense that we hope a team is willing to attempt.

In order to keep defenses in these alignments we utilize a variety of concepts, from widening our inside receivers to calling specific plays that put a bind on any defender that tries to play both the front and the coverage. When we get to the point where we can do this, the offense is at its most optimum in production.

Tomorrow, the run game and play-passes.

- Manny Matsakis

More on Gladwell and underdogs

Again, reiterating my point that likely underdogs benefit from a high variance (i.e. high-risk) strategy, but that it might be inappropriate for heavy favorites. From Dean Oliver, via Basketball Prospectus:

This is very important for a coach like Kentucky’s Rick Pitino. His game plan of three pointers and pressing defense is a high variance strategy, one that an underdog should take, not a favorite. This high variance strategy is how he got his unknown Providence team to the final 4 in 1986. This is how his Kentucky team came back from a record 33 point deficit a year ago. But continuously applying this high variance strategy on a team with great talent like Kentucky is asking for an upset. Kentucky has been among the favorites to win the NCAA title two out of the past three years, only to fall earlier than expected. Again this year, they were favorites, being preseason #1. But their high variance game plan cost them last night against Massachusetts. And it will likely cost them later on this season. Despite Kentucky’s immense talent, coach Rick Pitino’s risky game plan makes the team more susceptible to upsets.

Assorted links and notes

A lot to catch up on . . .

1. Great article on one-back (six man) pass protection.



2. BCS mania: The good Senator has consistently been one of the best voices on this BCS debate, so read up here and here. (And Dr Saturday has an informative response.) I generally agree that the whole thing is much ado about nothing, and a secret part of me wants the "PLAYOFFSSSS!" contingent to win so that they realize the imperfection of what they merely assumed would fix all the sports' ills. Specifically, absent from the debate -- along with an elementary understanding of the economics of college football, or just economics at all (with claims of socialism being thrown around) -- is an understanding of what National Champion is supposed to mean. The BCS does a pretty good job of finding the best overall team in terms of who would probably be favored to win against any other opponent. That excludes teams like Utah, but is a playoff unequivocally the best option? Were the New York Giants better than the New England Patriots two years ago? No, of course not. Maybe there are other benefits, but I don't think "fairness" is one of them. Or, as the Senator notes, if you want to talk about "fairness" in a meaningful way, then you're in the territory of "revenue sharing," which the NFL has to keep parity but is a strange thought when it comes to college sports.

3. Most important stats? Trojan Football Analysis ran some basic regressions on offensive and defensive stats to see which have the highest correlation with winning. Unsurprisingly -- for readers of this blog at least -- passing yards per attempt came out with an R-squared (a measure of correlation, basically) of 0.40, the second highest offensive stat, behind only scoring offense itself. Passing yards per attempt came out higher than yards, rushing per attempt, turnovers, red zone, and others. (But also see this post from the Sabermetric Research blog on the limits of R-squared.)

4. It's good to see that Kansas State fans can have a good laugh at their own expense. (H/t Sporting Blog).



5. The Mike Leach contrarian: T. Kyle King of Dawg Sports opens up two barrels of eloquent assault on Mike Leach. King says he doesn't know anything about the guy personally, but finds Leach's public persona -- particularly his recent comments about NFL coaches and the past two Texas A&M staffs -- "rude," "childish," and "churlish." (Nice.) I can't do the whole post justice (go read it) but a lot of it is based on the question: What in Leach's resume gives him the right to "demean[] his coaching coevals?" I've already said my bit, though I agree with Kyle that one reason Leach gets so much love from coaches (well, at least ones who aren't the subject of his criticism) and commentators is that he good for such quotes. The only thing I'll add is this: most of Leach's comments have come in the context of him trying to defend his players, though in his case it is special because much of the criticism of the players reflects on him. Most perspicuously, think Graham Harrell not getting drafted -- a "spread" quarterback. Harrell, unlike past Leach quarterbacks like Sonny Cumbie or Cody Hodges, turned down several other fairly big name schools to play for the Dread Pirate, and much of the criticism of Harrell came in the form of questioning what Harrell had been doing under Leach's tutelage. By contrast, guys like Stephen McGee -- who I actually assume that Leach had always respected as a player but probably marveled at how lamely he was used -- were drafted in spite of all coaching.

In other words, I think Leach took the Harrell situation personally in that, to him, the only apparent difference in the minds of NFL scouts between Harrell and McGee was that Harrell had the unfortunate distinction of being coached by Mike Leach to throw for a jillion yards while McGee got no coaching whatsoever, other than how to run some mediocre option. This might not be accurate, but it explains Leach's defensiveness. I also firmly believe that Leach is honest when he said his comments about McGee and A&M was directed at the coaches, not the player. To criticize other coaches for misusing a talented player is fairly brutal, especially considering Leach's consistent success against A&M. Now, I also sympathize with Mike Sherman's confusion about how to deal with barbs from a guy like Leach, but that's the world he's in. (The Mangini Crabtree situation was similar: he rushed to the defense of a player. And again, maybe not in the best of judgment, but not the best judgment for Mike Leach is different than it is for most.)

6. Four-verticals: Cheesehead TV identifies an example of the Green Bay Packers running the four-verticals concept from a five-wide set. (For another example of four-verts, check out this post.) See the clip on the NFL website here.

7. Try this at home: Speaking of video, I loved this old video of Bobby Bowden explaining the "Puntrooskie." People forget that Bowden, with the help of some good Florida talent, completely resuscitated that program and was himself a mastermind of the one-back three-wide pass attack Florida State rode to preeminence. In his way, Bowden was one of the first to go "spread," though it was a Sid Gillman, pro-style attack. (H/t EDSBS.)



8. Malzahnitude: The Joe Cribbs Car Wash combines two things I generally enjoy but am not universally enamored with: Gus Malzahn (new OC at Auburn) and Malcolm Gladwell. It's worth the read. One brief thought on Malzahn, however. Gus's big thing is that he believes in tempo. Of course, he hasn't really had a chance to go breakneck speed yet at Auburn (at least by the reports of those who have seen both Tulsa, his former stop, and Auburn practice), though the offense is apparently looking much better already. Ironically, he's improved -- over both Tuberville's prior offense and the Tuberville Franklin mash-up -- by just bringing some sound, simple schemes. Sure he has a lot of window dressing, but that offense had just gotten bad. Yet, at least in year one I'll be surprised if he works miracles.

What they did at Tulsa was wonderful, but Herb Hand -- who brought the zone blocking aspect of the running game to go with Malzahn's pace and power game schemes -- was an integral part of the Tulsa attack: they were co-offensive coordinators for a reason. And though Malzahn seems reasonably committed to the running the ball, he was always a pass first guy, so we'll just have to see how that flies without a true quarterback. And the X factor is Chizik, the head coach. Even if Malzahn's offense is good, there are few defensive minded guys who appreciate a three-and-out (which can happen to any offense) that takes about eight seconds to occur. How long is his leash? Time will tell.

What I've been reading

1. The Bunch Attack: Using Compressed Formations in the Passing Game - by Andrew Coverdale and Dan Robinson. Sometimes you have to go back and re-read the bible. The title now is a bit anachronistic -- the idea of the "bunch" revolutionizing the passing game is so 1997 -- but this book is still probably the best exegesis on the passing game out there. Of course, also check out Coverdale and Robinson's three volume series on the quick, or three-step passing game.

2. FDR: The First Hundred Days - by Anthony Badger. Can be read in about a day, and I learned things I previously did not know.

3. Notes from Underground- by Dostevsky. I enjoyed this translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. Word is that this is one of Mike Leach's favorite books. No comment on any possible parallelism between Leach and Notes's famous opening line, "I am a sick man . . . I am a wicked man."

4. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness - by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Thaler is the big behavioral economics guru (famous in football circles for doing a behavioral economic analysis on the NFL draft with Cade Massey of Duke*), and Sunstein is a law professor who specializes in administrative and regulatory law (though his writing is prolific and his interests varied). They were colleagues at the U of Chicago, but Sunstein moved to Harvard and now has been nominated to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Policy, which primarily reviews proposed regulations for efficacy and consistency with government wide policies. Sunstein is also a potential future Supreme Court nominee, though it is unlikely he would be tapped to replace Justice Souter.

About the book: I liked it, but I'm not raving. It takes a couple of behavioral economics' biggest or best ideas and stretches it out over the course of the book. I think it would make a great article (indeed, it has made several) but the book is uneven. The early chapters read like a high school level or at best freshman undergraduate level explanation of ideas like anchoring, availability, and representativeness -- all important heuristics to understand, but stretched out too long. But then, the book switches course to specific applications, and its choices are the minutiae of some rather byzantine laws and regulations, from Medicare Reform to potential social security reform. These are not gripping chapters.

I leave aside the broader political questions hovering over the book in terms of judging it (and the book tries mightily to stay apolitical). I note that Thaler and Sunstein call their approach "libertarian-paternalism" -- the idea is that we want to maintain maximum choice but nevertheless design the architecture in a way that makes it easier for people to make the right choices, or even if they make no choice at all. The only vaguely political comment I do have is that Thaler and Sunstein spend a lot of time justifying the "paternalistic" aspect to would be libertarians who are skeptical of all government interference. And indeed, there is much criticism of the book from this faction. But, since the book's initial conception, the political winds have shifted somewhat, and I would have enjoyed a more thorough defense of the "libertarian" half of their approach. The authors are committed to free choice, yet they mostly assume that everyone is with them on the point. This is not to say they are not, but debate is always good -- where there's light there's usually also heat.

5. On Writing Well, 30th Anniversary Edition: The Classic Guide to Writing Nonfiction - by William Zinsser. Blogging is great, but it's probably time I figured out what professionals, who have spent careers writing non-fiction, think and try to do.


* This deserves its own post, but economist Kevin Hassett has developed NFL draft rankings based on the Massey-Thaler paper. Who did the best in the 2009 NFL draft? I'll let Hassett and Thaler. Via the Nudge blog:

Hassett identifies four winners: New England Patriots, Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions Lions, and New York Giants.

New England’s coach, Bill Belichick,…ditched his first-round pick altogether and loaded up on four second-rounders. In addition, he traded some of his later picks for other teams’ second-round picks next year. The big news is that the Giants maneuvered to get two second-round and two third-round picks, elevating their final scores.

The big losers were the Washington Redskins, the New York Jets, and the San Francisco 49ers.

The Redskins once again revealed their extreme economic ignorance, trading away their second-round and fourth-round picks…The Jets made a classic error, falling in love with University of Southern California quarterback Mark Sanchez and virtually guaranteeing they will have a large number of undrafted scrubs on their roster. Given the high salaries at the top of the draft, Sanchez will probably not generate much value above that demanded by his salary, even if he becomes a superstar.

Thaler loves the Patriots draft and also gives a positive review to the Cleveland Browns. After entering the draft with the 5th pick overall, the Browns traded down three times to take center Alex Mack with the 21st pick, plus defensive end Kenyon Coleman, quarterback Brett Ratliff, safety Abram Elam, a second round pick from the Jets, and sixth round picks from the Buccaneers and the Eagles. That’s a lot of chances to pick up some solid starting players. Football pundits didn’t think so highly of the Browns draft, but none of them are economists.

Malcolm Gladwell loves me

Malcolm Gladwell's new article in the New Yorker is called "How David Beats Goliath: When underdogs break the rules." It's worth reading, but the main narrative is about a twelve-year old girls team that uses the full-court press to beat opponents. Ethical issues aside, a running theme here is the use of risky strategies that underdogs can use to beat teams that overmatch them. Sound familiar? I made the same argument recently, though in slightly more (though only slightly) technical terms: See Conservative and risky football strategies (and kurtosis).

Homer Smith on spreading receivers

Is "spreading" always a good idea? Maybe not, according to Coach Smith:

Misconception #31

[Misconception:] Relatively weaker offensive players have a better chance in a passing attack from spread formations.

Relatively weaker linemen have a better chance passing quick from the shotgun - yes. If you have good passing and receiving, a disparity in the line can be overcome.

However, if the defense has one man who can play one spread receiver man-for-man all over the field, the wide spreading of that receiver can be disastrous. Weaker receivers should stay within six yards of one another and cross. Two weaker receivers can make three stronger defenders cover them.

A weaker lineman must not be left alone on a stronger defender in front of the spot from which the QB throws. No lineman should be left alone in this situation.

A weaker back should not have to block a stronger lineman.

Now, what really enables the weaker to go against the stronger is faking - receiver faking, ball faking, all kinds of faking.

No - passing and spreading is not, alone, a better way for weaker players to play.

The detestable, inimical Mike Leach

As EDSBS points out, the detestable Mike Leach has a real issue with telling the truth, and the people (i.e. other highly paid coaches) are finally speaking out to put this outrage to an end.

It's been an incredible week for the head dread pirate of Lubbock, beginning with his reaction to the rumor, supposedly floated by the Cleveland Browns' Eric Mangini, that Michael Crabtree is a "diva."

"Michael Crabtree has been more successful as a receiver than that guy has a coach at this point," Leach said. " ... Part of the reason is he's (Crabtree) too shy to be like that."

Said Leach: "My definition of a diva is someone who's loud and self-absorbed. Michael Crabtree is the furthest thing from loud that I've seen."

[...]Leach described Crabtree as the "ultimate team player who would serve the 49ers well." As for Mangini? "Let's see how all those non-divas do up in Cleveland this year," Leach said.

Ouch. (Of course now it looks like that Graham Harrell might sign with Cleveland, though as of right now he has only a tryout.)

Then came Leach's comment about former Texas A&M quarterback Stephen McGee, who was drafted by the Dallas Cowboys in the fourth round. Now, McGee's career at A&M was, well, disappointing: he played in a triple option offense under Dennis Franchione, and then came Mike Sherman to go with a "pro-style offense" (that supposed holy grail for all potential NFL draftees), but he got hurt and finished his senior year as a backup. Asked about the Cowboys' pick, Leach said:

"I'm happy for Stephen McGee," Texas Tech coach Mike Leach said. "The Dallas Cowboys like him more than his coaches at A&M did."

Sherman, via official release, replied,

"I don't understand Coach Leach's comments about Stephen McGee," Sherman said Monday. "He was named our starter until he got injured. I've always believed in Stephen's character and I've always believed in his talent, and I always will. I see him having an outstanding NFL career.

"Coach Leach is in no position to comment about my relationship with Stephen McGee."

In the end, a perturbed Sherman addressed the issue two straight days. Leach, unable to not have the last word, fired back again.

"I never questioned the handling of the (A&M) players in any way and have always expressed the utmost respect for their coaching staff," Leach told The Avalanche-Journal.

"I’ve always said that it is truly exciting to play Texas A&M - the quality of coaches they have, the great team and great tradition and, above all, the quality of players they have," Leach continued. "I’ve always known A&M had great players. The fact that they have the luxury to put a third- or fourth-round draft pick on the bench, to me, identifies what a truly great team they are.

"It’s an honor for us at Texas Tech to have the opportunity to play them. There are numerous players on our team that will never get a look or play a down in the NFL, so you can imagine how exciting it is for me and them to go play a team the magnitude of Texas A&M and look over there on the bench and see third- and fourth-round draft picks."

And later:

"How can anyone not be shocked that they’re offended by this?" Leach told The A-J. "How is that possible? I mean, they’re the ones that keep issuing these official statements. I haven’t issued any official statement. I just answer questions when somebody asks me one."

Ah, great stuff. Sherman, of course, can't stay quiet either, so he has chimed in yet again as well.

Responded Sherman on Tuesday, "I'm not one to say that's just Mike being Mike. You're not going to get a free pass with me. I don't get a free pass. I would never comment about any of his guys."

McGee won the starting job last preseason, but was injured in the second game and never fully recovered. . . .

"That could have been taken as a shot at Stephen McGee that if he was so good then why didn't he play?" Sherman said. "Or it could have been taking a shot at the Cowboys, or at (former A&M coach) Dennis Franchione.

"Coach Franchione's job wasn't to try and make Stephen an NFL quarterback, it was to win football games. And if it was his feeling that running the football was his best choice, like it was when I was here (as an assistant) with R.C. (Slocum), then that's what he did."

I don't know much about Stephen McGee. I didn't see anything of him last year, though I saw him play a few times in Franchione's gun-option attack that never got off the ground. As far as NFL drafting quarterbacks, I don't have the data but it's hard to evaluate. Guys with talent who are late draft picks or undrafted have to get lucky to see the field, so there is a skew to high draft picks, and the NFL is big on measurables. Matt Stafford was projected as the #1 overall coming out of high school, and sure enough in college he neither got shorter nor threw the ball with less velocity, so he was there again. Leach is right that the NFL overvalues arm strength, and he is right that it is not nearly so scientific as all these NFL guys pretend. That said, where you get drafted is a pretty good predictor of what kind of career you will have -- on aggregate -- but there's a ton of noise, especially among quarterbacks.

But, if nothing else, we should all just be thankful we have Coach Leach to keep us entertained in the offseason. Maybe his next quarterback, Taylor Potts will get drafted: he's 6'5", 220 lbs.

P.S. I'll be out of pocket for the next few days at the Kentucky Derby. Betting suggestions welcome.

OK St.'s Gunter Brewer on four verticals and the seam-reader

Heard an anecdote relayed from Oklahoma State's offensive coordinator (good coach, entertaining speaker). He was talking about the four verticals concept, which I and Dan Gonzalez recently explored in depth.

As Dan explained, the key to this whole concept is the "seam-reader" -- the slot receiver who reads the deep coverage and can run a post, seam, or square-in. And as I explained, even if you don't give that player a full panoply of options, at minimum you tell one slot guy to read middle of the field open (two deep safeties) or closed (one deep): against middle of the field open the guy splits the safeties to streak down the middle void; against middle of the field closed the receiver stays up the hash to put the free safety in a bind between the two slot players.

In Okie State's terminology, they call this player the "beater." One thing Dan and I didn't talk much about was how do you decide which guy you want to be the "beater" or "divide route" -- the "get open" guy.

The first diagram shows it with the slot:



And the second shows it with the tight-end here (it could also just be the other slot):



So how do you choose who you want running it? Typically, as Dan draws it up, he likes his best receiver to line up in the slot and to drill that down. You also can do it just to the field: if the ball is on one hashmark you can have the receiver to the wide side run it because he has more freedom.

Brewer addressed this question, and talked about that for him it is often a matter of personnel. Specifically, if you get in three-wide gun (as Okie State often is), the defense often subs in a nickel defensive back for a linebacker. But the problem there is that the defensive back is better than the linebacker: he doesn't go for all the fakes and moves that the seam-reader or "beater" player uses to get open.

To illustrate what they did he told an interesting anecdote. Brewer used to be an assistant and offensive coordinator at Marshall back in the Bob Pruett days, where he coached Chad Pennington (and some guy named Randy Moss). They decided to run the "beater" to the side where the linebacker was and away from the nickel back.

But the problem was that the other teams would often shift this. Fortunately, Pennington was a pretty bright guy, so they let him determine who was going to be the beater pre-snap.

And how did they communicate it? Pennington would get to the line, turn to the side where the linebacker was and not the nickel defender (and hence the also the slot he wanted to run the "beater"), and would just clap in that general direction. Everyone knew what it meant, and off they went.

Best offensive staff poll: Urban's way

The poll for best offensive staff turned into a two-man race between Mike Leach and Urban Meyer, but Meyer ran away with it with 28% of the vote to Leach's 17%. A distant third was Oklahoma with Stoops and Wilson at 8%, along with "other" at 8% as well. Not a total surprise, but I have to wonder how the poll would have been if I'd constructed it better: I left off Georgia Tech's Paul Johnson.

Feel free to comment on the votes.